Main argument
IPG argues that rigging claims have been a constant feature of Kenya’s election cycles, but that historically they have worked more as tools to gain political power than as a genuine commitment to electoral integrity. It says the 2017 claims follow the same pattern. These are the report’s conclusions, and they are contested political claims.

What the report covers

• What counts as rigging: It separates election fraud (wrongful intent) from malpractice (negligence) and systemic manipulation, using IFES definitions. It notes that severe malpractice can rise to criminal malpractice, and that mere allegations can erode public confidence and depress participation even when no fraud occurs.
• A history of claims: It walks through the elections of 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 (and its violent aftermath) and 2013. The first rigging claim it records is the 1966 “little general election.” It says the 1988 election, with its queue-voting nominations, stands out as one whose legitimacy was in question.
• The ballot-printing firm: It highlights that the British firm Smith and Ouzman printed Kenya’s ballot papers at every election from 1992. Successive ooppositions accused it of supplying extra ballots to the incumbent, yet nobody pushed to drop it, even after the 2007 crisis. The firm and its directors were later convicted in the UK for bribery to win printing contracts, and Kenya has since charged officials involved.
• Opposition leader’s pattern: It argues that Raila Odinga claimed the 1997 and 2007 elections were stolen but afterwards joined or merged with the same governments. It calls his March 2013 “Democracy on Trial” speech the foundation of the 2017 claims.
• The 2013 petition: The Supreme Court found no substantial anomalies in the declared results, and found the registration process transparent, accurate and verifiable, though it flagged possible criminal malpractice in the technology procurement.

The eight 2017 rigging claims it examines

1. Rigging by the IEBC
2. Use of security agencies
3. Use of the voter register
4. Use of manual processes
5. Disenfranchising opposition areas
6. Use of the Interior Ministry
7. Hacking electronic systems
8. Use of prisoners

Consequences
Opposition figures have described the consequences of a rigged election in dire terms. IPG concludes that violence would follow if the 2017 election were alleged to have been rigged, and that Kenya “stands at a precipice.”

Recommendations

1. The opposition should produce empirical evidence of rigging, not alarmist claims.
2. The IEBC should give observers and monitors greater access to its processes.
3. IEBC professionals should meet the duty of care they owe under the electoral code of conduct, to avoid negligence or interference that could nullify the election.
4. The IEBC should verify and provide access to the data at the heart of its work.
5. The IEBC should report election data efficiently, in a consistent format, to all stakeholders at once.